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A B S T R A C T
China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has attracted the world's attention since it was proposed. This study
focuses on the BRI in the energy sector in ASEAN. It examines the current status of China's investment into
ASEAN's energy sector. It then discusses the problems of China's investment into the ASEAN energy sector with
two cases in Myanmar. In addressing the problems and challenges, the study adopts a ‘sense of ownership’
framework to analyze how to improve the acceptability of the Chinese investment. It argues that the BRI
priorities, including ‘people-to-people bond’, provide an opportunity to bring a sense of ownership to the
community networking that is to be built as a key part of BRI and more profoundly, an opportunity to establish a
good image and to make investment projects successful.
1. Introduction
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI hereafter), China's most ambitious
global initiative during Xi Jinping's presidency, brings about opportu-
nities as well as challenges to Southeast Asia. Through the Belt (the Silk
Road Economic Belt) and the Road (the 21st-century Maritime Silk
Road), the Chinese government has been trying to connect China to
other parts of the world through a wide variety of connectivity.
Southeast Asia is located on the critical point of the 21st Century
Maritime Silk Road and it plays an important role in the BRI. While the
BRI is expected to have many positive impacts, such as financing in-
frastructure construction and narrowing technical gap, it is also ques-
tioned for issues such as its possibility of damaging the environment of
the countries alongside BRI [1,2].
The Southeast Asian energy sector, with its abundant resources and
huge demand of investment, has also brought about opportunities as
well as challenges to the Chinese investment and thus offering lessons
and experiences to explore the prospect of the BRI. With fast growth of
economy, the Southeast Asian countries are in bad need of infra-
structure investment. The McKinsey Global Institute forecasts the need
for over $2 trillion in infrastructure investment across ASEAN,1 in-
cluding the sectors of transportation, energy, and telecommunications
[3]). China plays an influential role in energy investment in Southeast
Asia from 2000 when China's overseas investment became active. De-
spite this good progress in the institutional level, China's investment in
ASEAN, however, often incurs significant criticisms, e.g., the Myitsone
Dam project2 has been suspended since 2011 [4]. The Chinese overseas
investments play an important role in forging people's bound with
China as well. For many people of countries alongside BRI, the Chinese
overseas projects offered the only real channel to learn about China. A
bad impression could create a poor image of China. Therefore, under-
standing the causes why such projects have not been supported would
help both China and these countries to clarify misunderstanding, avoid
negative impact and formulate proper policies to reap the potential
mutual benefits from BRI.
While there is an increasing number of studies on the BRI, there is
no discussion from the perspective of sense of ownership. The existing
literature on the BRI can be broadly classified into two groups. The first
group reviews motivation, framework, assessment and issues on the BRI
[1,5–7]; [2,8–10]. The views are unsurprisingly mixed: while a large
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proportion of papers hold positive opinions, others concern their en-
vironmental and energy consequences [1,2]. The other group of studies
are quantitative analyses of the expected impact of the BRI, such as its
impact on Chinese overseas direct investment [11]. In the studies fo-
cusing on the field of energy and BRI, the topics relate to energy in-
vestment [12], energy security [5], clean energy [13], energy co-
operation [9], and convergence of energy efficiency [14]. However,
there is a lack of study in examining social issues with Chinese overseas
investment under the BRI.
The BRI has the potential to further exaggerating the problems that
have existed in China's investment in the ASEAN energy sector and thus
needs to be studied. The BRI is expected to encourage more Chinese
overseas activities, mainly investment activities. The public projects
can be multiplied by the increasing activities of investment conducted
by Chinese companies that are encouraged by the BRI. However, if
these companies conduct business as usual, the business may not be
sustainable as local protests can escalate and burst at some stage that
will damage China's foreign relations. Therefore, the Chinese should
learn from the experience of their overseas investment and make pre-
paration for a successful implementation of the BRI.
Adopting the concept ‘sense of ownership’, this study explores why
some energy investment projects in ASEAN can be successful while
other projects are controversial. Studying this issue is critical and
timely under China's BRI, which has encouraged its enterprises, both
state-owned and private, to make further investment in energy sector in
almost all ASEAN countries. However, given the poor social acceptance
of Chinese investment in ASEAN and public protests are delaying pro-
jects here and there in the region, further expansion of the Chinese
investment in the ASEAN energy sector has raised scepticism in
Southeast Asia. Against this context, ‘sense of ownership’ is important
not only for the enterprises to establish ‘good image’ of itself, but also
for the BRI to be successfully implemented.
This study suggests that, among the five cooperation priority areas,
namely policy coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade,
financial integration, and people-to-people bond,3 in the official docu-
ment ‘Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt
and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road’,4 ‘people-to-people bond’ should
be the forerunner of BRI, even though it will not create immediate and
tangible outcomes at the moment. However, it can create a friendly and
enabling environment that minimizes challenges and difficulties for the
BRI (investment) projects. The term ‘people-to-people bond’ first ap-
peared in the Chinese official document ‘Vision and Actions on Jointly
Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk
Road’. ‘People-to-people bond’ can also be a catalyst for energy in-
vestment in ASEAN through its facilitating role in contributing to the
success of energy investment projects. Therefore, how to achieve
‘people-to-people bond’ would be a critical issue that must be addressed
carefully, especially in light of the increasing investment activities
under the BRI.
With this said, this paper makes the following contributions: it
utilizes the concept ‘sense of ownership’ to analyze the success and
failure of energy sector investment in ASEAN; it links the ‘sense of
ownership’ to the ‘people-to-people bond’ and provides a theoretical
foundation for the ‘people-to-people bond’ under the BRI; it also
demonstrates a key element for the success of BRI; and it gives sug-
gestions as to how to apply ‘people-to-people bond’ in the overseas
investment to make BRI successful.
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 reviews the metho-
dology of ‘sense of ownership’ in natural resource development plan-
ning; section 3 discusses China's investment in ASEAN's energy sector
and reviews two cases in the energy sector in Myanmar; section 4 ap-
plies the methodology in analyzing the two case studies; section 5
discusses ways to achieve sense of ownership and thus facilitates BRI;
and the last section concludes the paper with policy implications.
2. Methodology
Described as an integral part to address problems and seek solutions
[15–17], the concept of ‘sense of ownership’ has been widely applied in
the literature when natural resource planning and development is
concerned. Adopting the ‘sense of ownership’ concept, Warren and
McFadyen [18] explores the influences of different development models
on public attitudes towards a community-owned windfarm in south-
west Scotland. The result is that public attitudes are more positive to-
wards windfarm developments in areas where local communities have a
direct involvement in them than in areas where they do not. The result
supports the contention that a change of development model towards
community ownership could have a positive effect on public attitudes
towards windfarm developments in Scotland. Marks and Davis [19]
present a measure of ‘sense of ownership’ for piped water systems in 50
rural Kenyan villages. Their study establishes an empirical referent for
households' ‘sense of ownership’ and finds that some types of partici-
pation enhance community members' ‘sense of ownership’ for rural
water projects. Lachapelle [20] uses ‘sense of ownership’ in the study
and application of community development. In his research, ‘sense of
ownership’ is described as a concept through which to assess whose
voice is heard, who has influence over decisions, and who is affected by
the process and outcome. The study presents a formal description and
explanation of ‘sense of ownership’ as applied to community develop-
ment, finding that enhanced public involvement in community plan-
ning and development efforts is of critical importance to the support,
involvement or commitment of interested or affected parties to com-
munity development.
Being used to analyze the subject of natural resources projects, the
‘sense of ownership’ refers to “a shared sense of problem and process
necessary to address the precarious world of wicked situations” [21];
283). Lachapelle and McCool [21] have found that the ‘sense of own-
ership’ is a critical element in natural resource planning and develop-
ment. They clarify the concept of ‘sense of ownership’ to include three
essential characteristics and related questions. The first characteristic is
the ‘sense of ownership’ in process. The second characteristic is the
‘sense of ownership’ in outcome. The third characteristic of ‘sense of
ownership’ involves who is affected by the action and how the effects of
a decision are distributed, accepted and owned spatially and temporally
across diverse social, political and ecological scales. With an implicit
reallocation and redistribution of power, citizens and agencies jointly
define, share, and address a problem, which creates a ‘sense of own-
ership’. In other words, when both citizens and agencies are engaged in
the planning process of natural resource development, a ‘sense of
ownership’ is created, which is a necessary factor to lead to smoother
implementation of the project. Such engagement is also applicable to
technical and bureaucratic processes since the engagement does not
necessarily mean that the public will make technical decisions, but
rather mean that they are informed. Fig. 1 illustrates these three
characteristics in a brief way.
With this ‘sense of ownership’ framework, this study analyzes the
success and failure of energy sector investment in ASEAN and to pro-
vide a theoretical foundation for the people-to-people bond under the
BRI. Some other corporate social responsibility type approaches have
also been used to analyze community acceptance of resource-mining
3 The official document highlights that “[p]eople-to-people bond provides the
public support for implementing the Initiative. We should carry forward the
spirit of friendly cooperation of the Silk Road by promoting extensive cultural
and academic exchanges, personnel exchanges and cooperation … …so as to
win public support for deepening bilateral and multilateral cooperation”. Here
‘people-to-people bond’ refers to bonding between the peoples of each nation
and the people of China.
4 The official document ‘Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road
Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road’ was jointly issued by
National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
and Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China in 2015 in Beijing.
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such as the theory of ‘mining community engagement’ [22–24]. How-
ever, it lacks the capacity to provide enough understanding into the
community's expectations, concerns and level of acceptance to achieve
a project's sustainability [23,25–28]. Therefore, this study uses the
framework of ‘sense of ownership’ to analyze such issues related with a
community. The ‘sense of ownership’ theory gives a deep step-by-step
understanding of those issues by specifying three characteristics of the
concept.
3. China's investment in ASEAN's energy sector
This section reviews the current status of Chinese investment in
ASEAN's energy sector and discusses particularly two projects in the
energy sector of Myanmar to identify the problems of such investment.
3.1. Current status of China's investment in ASEAN's energy sector
Since China started building market economy in the early 1990s,
China's overseas direct investment in ASEAN has increased quickly.
Particularly, some energy resource-rich ASEAN states have witnessed a
rapid expansion of China's investment inflows since 2000s. During the
past two decades, Chinese companies have invested heavily in ASEAN's
energy sector, including oil and gas pipelines, power generation and
transmission in countries such as Myanmar, Laos, Indonesia, Vietnam,
Cambodia, and Malaysia. All these countries have seen an increase in
Chinese investments in power plants construction and/or oil and gas
exploration and development [29]. Even before the BRI was proposed,
many Chinese companies had already been involved in various con-
struction projects in Southeast Asia. Chinese investors invest in the
majority of hydro power projects in Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar.
These three countries have a very significant hydropower potential
which is underdeveloped due to a lack of finance and market [30].
China Three Gorges Corporation and China Huadian are quite active in
building hydropower plants in the region. Between 2006 and 2011,
China invested more than 6.1 billion US dollars in financing 2729MW
of hydro capacity additions in the three countries [31]. Chinese com-
panies also invest in power grids and thermal power plants in Cambodia
and oil and gas pipelines in Myanmar. The energy sector of Indonesia
and Singapore receive Chinese investment as well. In Indonesia, for
example, many energy-related or other infrastructure projects started in
2012 and 2013. In the energy sector, particularly, Sinopec invested in
an oil storage terminal in the Batam Free Trade Zone. China Power
Investment and Anhui Conch Cement got involved with a hydropower
project in North Kalimantan, Indonesia. Sinohydro, Gezhouba Group
and China Power International invested in hydropower and thermal
power projects [32]. Further, as Indonesia is a key supplier of coal and
natural gas for China's energy-intensive coastal areas, several Chinese
companies have maintained operations in coalmines in various parts of
Indonesia. In Singapore, PetroChina and Huaneng Power International
are involved in the construction of an oil terminal and operation of a
power plant respectively. Fig. 2 presents the foreign direct investment
in ASEAN's energy sector during the past decade. The amount of Chi-
nese investment in ASEAN's energy sector had already been huge before
BRI. Even in 2009, the FDI in ASEAN's energy sector already went up to
about $3500 million. In 2015, after BRI was proposed, the investment
hit the level of more than $6000 million [33]. Most of the investment
went to coal sector in Indonesia. An interesting point is that the in-
vestment declined sharply from more than $6000 million in 2015 to
only about $2000 million in 2016. A major reason is that Chinese
regulators began closely monitoring outbound coal investment. Banks
are increasingly reluctant to fund coal-fired power plant projects as
they now have a stricter standard for coal investment, including the
overseas one.5
The following sub-sections use two projects in Myanmar to elabo-
rate Chinese investment in energy sector in ASEAN and the problems
Chinese investment faces.
3.2. Case study of two projects in Myanmar
Two high profile projects in Myanmar with different results high-
light the challenges of Chinese investment into ASEAN's energy sector
and possible solutions. One project is the oil and gas pipelines. Despite
years of delays, the twin oil and gas pipelines run in parallel from
Kyaukphyu, Myanmar to China's Southwestern Yunnan province, open
in 2013 and 2017 respectively. The other is the Myitsone Dam project.
Meant to be the largest hydropower project in Myanmar, the Myitsone
Dam started amidst strong local opposition. Moving towards democ-
racy, the Myanmar government finally ordered the suspension of the
controversial project in 2011 [34].
The Myanmar's oil and gas pipelines project is relatively successful.
In this case, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has built up
a ‘good image’ for itself and its partners so that the pipeline projects are
acceptable by the society. CNPC has tried to be immersed into the
country and the society of Myanmar, making the people of Myanmar
accepts them. A Myanmar local told a journalist that “they (CNPC and
its partners) have paved road for our village. We have a very good and
harmonious relationship. We are even together to celebrate New Year”
[35]. Therefore, although the pipeline projects have encountered
challenges such as criticisms of environmental damages and human
rights violation, most of the local people still support the projects [36].
Further, in an MCPWC report, it is recorded that in townships where the
pipelines go through and the farmers strongly demanded compensa-
tions for what they lost due to the pipeline construction, a tripartite
group has been formed, including the representatives from the gov-
ernment, the company and the affected farmers [37]. The compensation
issue, hardly solvable though, has been solved with efforts to satisfy the
local communities as much as possible. All these efforts to materialize
‘sense of ownership’ have made it difficult for the NGOs to mobilize the
local communities to oppose the projects. Consequently, when some
people planned to protest against the projects during the Songkran
Festival, many villagers refused to participate in Ref. [35].
In contrast, the Myitsone Dam project performed very badly in
creating itself a ‘good image’. Even when the environmental and social
impact assessment (ESIA) was conducted, China Power Investment
Corporation (CPI) had already begun to destroy its reputation. CPI had
contracted ESIA to two institutions. One is the Biodiversity and Nature
Conservation Association (BANCA), which alleges that the Myitsone
Dam project has a serious threat on the biological diversity, residents
living and the ecology of downstream Irrawaddy River. It is stated that
“there is no need for such a big dam to be constructed at the confluence
of Ayeyarwady River6” [38]; p. 42). However, the other contractor for
the ESIA, Changjiang Institute of Survey, Planning, Design and Re-
search (CISPDR), declares that Myitsone Dam project has no restrictive
influence on biodiversity, watershed ecosystem and dam safety and
suggests building the Dam [39]. The contradictory conclusions of the
two reports provoked questions and protests of the Myanmar people on
the Myitsone Dam project. Further, in 2013, the ESIA was reviewed by a
Fig. 1. Three characteristics of ‘sense of ownership’.
5 Interview by the author at Fudan University, Shanghai in October 2017.
6 Ayeyarwady River is also known as the Irrawaddy River.
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panel of Myanmar and international experts [40], which found the
CISPDR's report “contains some serious deficiencies and flawed con-
clusions” with “superficial analysis of the dams' impacts on freshwater
biodiversity” [41]; p. 1). Therefore, it is not surprising that CPI has been
regarded one of the “worst companies operating in Myanmar from a
corporate social responsibility perspective” [42]; p. 118).
3.3. Problems of Chinese investment in ASEAN's energy sector
The contrast of the two cases shows how important a company
(project)'s good image is and the Chinese companies are still dis-
advantaged in creating their positive image. From the comparative
analysis, we found that there are many problems with China's invest-
ment in ASEAN energy sector. The causes, however, are complicated.
From the individual investor's perspective, the challenges could stem
from inexperience on the part of Chinese investors who are new to
international investment practices. Due to their lack of experience in
dealing with inter-cultural differences, Chinese investors may have in-
appropriately applied their domestic practices to overseas contexts. For
example, push of projects amid controversies will bring negative feed-
backs but Chinese companies always suppose such push be acceptable
in order to effectively move the project forward. Problems also take
place when individual workers or companies lack self-discipline and
thus cause damages to the group as a whole.
In addition, investors are weak in building a ‘sense of ownership’
within the local community. Chinese investors are good at dealing with
governments but are poor, and even reluctant to deal with NGOs, who
play a big role in building consensus. In the unsuccessful Myanmar
cases, NGOs have been playing a major role in fighting with the Chinese
investors. Another problem is that the Chinese investors do not know
how to build long-term common interests with local community. They
are good at providing once-off benefits, such as building schools and
paving roads, but are often reluctant to employ local people. They are
not capable in developing other joint efforts, such as capacity and
business development for local communities, which are critical for the
sustainable development of local communities with natural resources
[43].
Technically, energy projects, such as hydropower projects, often
have significant and complicated social and environmental impacts on
the environment and local communities, and are controversial in
nature. The fact that China is a key player at most of the energy projects
in less developed ASEAN countries makes people believe that China
may have pressured these host countries to comprise their social and
environmental interests during the project development. Besides being
a key player in many energy projects in ASEAN, China is also a major
donor to the less developed countries in the region, which further
makes China's investment behavior suspicious to the outsiders. The
following section discusses in detail the application of ‘sense of own-
ership’ to Chinese investment in Myanmar's energy sector, elaborating
the importance of this concept.
4. Application of the ‘sense of ownership’ to energy projects: case
study of two Chinese projects in Myanmar
This section discusses the concept of ‘sense of ownership’ and ela-
borates that how the BRI provides a direction to achieve ‘sense of
ownership’. Adopting two cases of energy investment in Myanmar, it
analyzes how ‘sense of ownership’ is important to a natural resource
project. This section first briefly reviews the concept of ‘sense of own-
ership’. It then applies the concept into Myanmar's energy sector to
elaborate how ‘sense of ownership’ is important to an energy project.
Lastly it summaries and highlights its importance.
4.1. Application of ‘sense of ownership’ to Chinese investment to in
Myanmar's energy sector
This subsection elaborates the application and the importance of
‘sense of ownership’ by characteristics.
4.1.1. The first characteristic: ‘sense of ownership’ in process
Who has a voice and whose voice is heard is an integral factor of the
‘sense of ownership’. The ‘sense of ownership’ in process allows agen-
cies and citizens to negotiate ideas, which imposes a process that at-
tempts to build mutual understanding of interest and shared definitions
of problems. Not having an ability to have voice heard can diminish the
‘sense of ownership’ in a situation where projects such as resource de-
velopment or public infrastructure expansion are ultimately determined
by factors of social and political desirability ([21]; p. 281 [20]; p. 54).
Here the social and political desirability is materialized by making the
voice heard. This characteristic applies to the initial period of a project.
Cases show that in the beginning of a project, ‘voices are heard’ is
the key to the real materialization of ‘sense of ownership’. For example,
China-Myanmar oil and gas pipelines project is quite successful in this
sense. In this project, CNPC has spent all efforts to materialize ‘sense of
ownership’ and have basically built up a ‘good image’ for itself. From
the beginning of the China-Myanmar oil and gas pipelines project, at-
tention has been paid to land acquisition, environmental protection and
recruitment of local people. Land acquisition and compensation follows
Fig. 2. Foreign direct investment in ASEAN's energy sector (in million dollars) (2008–2016).
Source: Heritage Foundation; uploaded by Knoema
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the principle that the acquisition does not take arable land or take
arable land as little as possible. The acquisition is based on the principle
of voluntary. If any villagers do not agree with the acquisition, the
pipeline will bypass their land. The principle of ‘compensation first, and
then using the land’ is strictly followed and the compensation is directly
paid to the villagers [44]). The report delivered by MCPWC provides
the details of the land acquisition: the State Peace and Development
Council (SPDC) in Myanmar formed a committee for the land acquisi-
tion and compensation. Members in the committee included the re-
presentatives from SPDC, Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), the
Township General Administrative Department, the Township Land
Register Department, the Township Agriculture Department, the Village
Tract Administer, community leaders and the farmers themselves. All
the representatives together did a field study regarding the land and the
crops on the land. Based on the field study, they calculated the amount
of compensations, and submitted them to the government for approval.
The land and crop compensation agreements were signed between the
farmers and the concerned company on behalf of MOGE when the ap-
proval was issued [37].
By this way, voices of the local people have been heard, making
them have the ‘sense of ownership’ at the very beginning of the project.
Further, to protect environment, the design and construction of the
pipelines have adopted high international engineering standards. The
environmental impact assessment (EIA) has been carried out by a
Thailand-based company through an international tender. The EIA re-
port gives comprehensive in-depth assessment of a number of en-
vironmental factors including air, noise, water quality, animals, and
plants. The report also identifies feasible solutions for mitigating or
preventing the potential effects of the pipelines on the environment
[45]. This makes the local people feel not only ‘voices are heard’, but
also ‘lives are respected’. Hence, a ‘sense of ownership’ was successfully
created at the starting of the project.
By contrast, the Myitsone Dam project has not created ‘sense of
ownership’ among the local people whose ‘voices were not heard’ from
its beginning. The result is that the project has been suspended since
2011. Villagers had been relocated into the so-called ‘model villages’ to
make way for the dam, yet the housing in the ‘model villages’ and the
living standard of these relocated people had deteriorated. There was
insufficient drinking water and inadequate education and health care.
The relocated people had to do low-paid daily wage jobs to feed
themselves and they had to be constantly worrying about their future
[46]. In terms of compensation, it is found that some of the payments
had been passed to the Myanmar government rather than directly to the
relocated people [47]. Further, no evidence suggests that the compen-
sation scheme has been improved since the suspension of the project.
Some relocated people even suggested that the compensation payments
were irregular. Consequently, some villagers refused to relocate and
even worse, the relocation was reportedly carried out using military
intimidation [42]. Such activities did not ‘hear the voices of grassroots
and local people’. As a former employee of a Chinese dam developer
said, “[i]t is a key habit of Chinese enterprises to always follow the
government's instruction” [42]; p. 115), and that “[o]nly upon the
suspension of the Myitsone Dam, CPI (China Power Investment Cor-
poration) understood that there is a public opinion with influence in
Myanmar” [42]; p. 118). However, the ex post remedies cannot restart
the project.
4.1.2. The second characteristic: ‘sense of ownership’ in outcome
‘Sense of ownership’ may challenge conventional notions of power
over the outcome. With this said, the ‘sense of ownership’ requires re-
distribution and reallocation of power over decision-making and ex-
ecution of actions. Redistribution of power is complicated. Therefore, it
always remains a political task no matter how little power is conceded
or allocated to citizens. Such redistribution or reallocation of power can
sometimes be practically impossible. Therefore, the ‘sense of owner-
ship’ needs to be promoted in some other more tacit forms such as
“providing information, promoting alternative public participation
processes, encouraging different forms of knowledge to be used in
planning, and allowing more interaction between scientists, developers
and citizens” [20]; p. 55). When a project is under construction, ‘sense
of ownership’ can be promoted by allowing more interaction and more
involvement of a wide variety of people, such as consulting scientists
and recruiting citizens, and so on. With this said, the China-Myanmar
oil and gas pipelines project creates ‘sense of ownership’ by recruiting
local people. The pipelines project has created many jobs for local
communities and cultivated a team of technical and managerial experts
in pipeline operation. During the peak construction period, local em-
ployment in Myanmar reached more than 6000 people, more than 60%
of the total employees of the project [40]; p. 39). This is the real ma-
terialization of ‘sense of ownership’, making it another contributor for
the project success.
The ‘tacit forms’ are not only limited to those directly related with
the project per se, but also involving the activities that make the de-
velopers more ‘socially responsible’ with the local people. Still in the
China-Myanmar oil and gas pipelines case, CNPC and its partners have
supported social responsibility-related projects such as education, road
transport, power supply, health care, drinking water, and some other
public good projects along the pipeline routes. A municipal water
system to deliver potable water has been built, providing 220,000 tons
of fresh water per year to more than 2000 local residents. School fa-
cilities have been improved for nearly 20,000 Myanmar students. More
convenient and reliable medical services have been brought to nearly
800,000 local people [48]. By contrast, for the Myitsone Dam project,
CPI had relevant social responsibility policies, yet these were more oral
promise and plans than real practice and implementation. In the end of
2013, CPI issued its first social responsibility report. Yet the time cov-
erage of its report is until the end of 2012, one year after the suspension
of Myitsone Dam. The report indicated that most of the social respon-
sibility practice was taken after the construction was stopped. In other
words, it was ex post remedies [40]. Once again, the CPI did not do well
enough to create ‘sense of ownership’ of the local people.
4.1.3. The third characteristic: the ownership distribution
The third characteristic can involve not only individuals in the
physical place where a project (development effort) originates but also
larger scales of engaged citizens across a region, a country and even
multi-nations. Practice suggests that the more people have the ‘sense of
ownership’, the more social and politically acceptability is created.
Temporally, the ‘sense of ownership’ involves not only the present but
also future generations who may reap the benefits or bear costs of any
development decisions, for example those that may result in or mitigate
climate change [20]. Failure to materialize this characteristic can result
in a total loss of ‘sense of ownership’ within the local people.
A typical example can also be found in the Myitsone Dam case. The
affected area of the Myitsone Dam project is not only limited to the
project site, but it also covers the whole basin of the Irrawaddy River,
the mother river of Myanmar. However, CPI did not fully assess the
affected area and people of the dam. The company's social responsi-
bility practice was mainly focused on the community where the dam
site was located and the beneficiaries were the people who were ef-
fectively under the jurisdiction of the Myanmar government. The result
of these practices is the misallocation of the benefits and risks of dam
construction in different regions and different groups of people.
Obvious evidence is that the local government where the project was
located had taken most of the economic benefits, while the general
population of the whole basin had to undertake the potential negative
social and environmental effects of the project [49].
4.2. The importance of ‘sense of ownership’
Our two case studies show that successful implementations of a
project/development effort are those that materialize the three
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characteristics of the ‘sense of ownership’. In the above-mentioned
success case of China-Myanmar oil and gas pipelines, it can be seen that
from the very beginning of the project, voice from the local grassroots is
heard. Land acquisition is basically based on voluntary. If land is ac-
quired, compensation is directly paid to the local people before using
the land. A variety of types of public participation has been pushed such
as recruiting local people and cultivating a team of technical and
managerial experts. Further, a comprehensive in-depth assessment of
environmental impact has been undertaken to eliminate doubts about
the impact of environmental factors including air, noise, water, animals
and so on. Therefore, all the three characteristics of ‘sense of owner-
ship’, i.e., the sense of ownership in process, outcome, and distribution
have been materialized in the successful project.
Other cases also show that ‘sense of ownership’ leads to greater
public acceptance of natural resource projects. For example, a study on
the onshore windfarm development in southwest Scotland shows that
public attitudes are more positive to windfarm developments in areas
where local communities have a stronger ‘sense of ownership’ than in
areas where they are not directly involved in the windfarm develop-
ments [18]. Another study on the rural water systems development in
Kenya shows that psychologically ‘sense of ownership’ can make
workers more likely to exhibit job satisfaction and organization-based
self-esteem, which facilitates the development of rural water systems in
the country [19]. Having passed the World Bank's strict sustainability
assessment, the Nam Theun 2 Hydroelectric Project in Laos has gained
community support and become a role model in development of large
hydro power projects [50].
To put it simply, the key to success is that China's investment must
be associated with expanding the overseas business to cultivate the
‘sense of ownership’ by putting the local people in their consciousness
so that they feel they are a part of efforts to achieve ‘common aspira-
tion’. Table 1 presents the key elements of ‘sense of ownership’.
5. ‘Sense of ownership’: A key to facilitate BRI
Using the framework presented in Section 2, we find that the Chi-
nese investors should pay more attention to its ways in dealing with
local communities in order to build ‘sense of ownership’. Building up a
‘sense of ownership’ is not easy, yet it is important due to the increasing
overseas investment under the BRI. The ‘people-to-people bond’ prin-
ciple under BRI provides a platform and opportunity to realize ‘sense of
ownership’ so that development projects can have a friendlier en-
vironment. That is to say, ‘people-to-people bond’ can be a catalyst for
energy investment in ASEAN through its facilitating role in contributing
to the success of energy investment projects.
Although the priority of people-to-people bond in the BRI provides a
new guideline for Chinese investment to build the ‘sense of ownership’,
its implementation is not satisfactory. The BRI action plan emphasizes
that the BRI “should be jointly built through consultation to meet the
interests of all, and efforts should be made to integrate the development
strategies of the countries along the Belt and Road”. With this strategic
direction, the Chinese investors are aware of the importance of own-
ership in building with local communities so as to gain public support
for specific projects, including those in the energy sector that are often
controversial. However, the actual implementation is still un-
satisfactory. Although the principle of people-to-people bond has been
well followed in the Myanmar-China pipeline projects, such bond was
not well formed in the Myitsone Dam project.
In order to deal with likely increasing overseas investment activities
under the BRI, particularly for energy investment projects, the Chinese
investors need to fully understand the public opinion and to undertake
good social responsibility performance. Establishment of mechanisms
to share benefits with the local communities over the project's life time
is a way to gain sustainable support from the community. In other
words, it is very important that the local people have achieved a ‘sense
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level, building such an ownership needs China to change a few prac-
tices, including the way to presenting its BRI and replace unilateral
efforts with bilateral and even multilateral efforts. Specifically, Chinese
investors can take following measures.
The first and the most important thing is to understand and respect
the different views and norms of people in other countries. Even inside
China, it took decades for Chinese citizens to accept the doctrine of
‘Development is Absolute Principle’. In fact, in ASEAN communities,
such an ideology change has not yet been initiated and economic ad-
vancement may not be viewed as a ‘win’ outcome for them. More im-
portantly, it takes time to show to the public that the projects are
beneficial to the local communities. In this case, project development
may need patience and the process may be tortuous and not straight-
forward. Pushing a project through amid controversies may not ne-
cessarily gain good acceptance once the project is completed. In con-
trast to the Chinese normal practice, it might be better to invest time in
building consensus and a ‘sense of ownership’ in local communities so
as to nurture a good working environment for them rather than swiftly
push projects development. This requirement is exactly reflected in the
first characteristic of ‘sense of ownership’, i.e., the developer shall
identify who has a voice and make sure their voice be heard at the very
beginning of a project.
The second way is to improve communication methods. The Chinese
investors are often good at making relationship with government but
poor in communication with the local people, or the grassroots. In
particular, Chinese investors are reluctant to dialogue with those
having opposite interests and they lack experiences in organizing
groups to support their projects. For these reasons, the project devel-
opers are often facing direct conflict with the local people. To reverse
this situation, the project developers could organize supporting groups,
or even supporting NGOs as an intermediate to communicate with the
local people to minimize misunderstanding and controversies, to for-
mulate better project designs and compensation scheme, and to address
the disputes and controversies on their projects. This measure is also
where the first and second characteristic of ‘sense of ownership’ can be
reflected. Hearing the local communities' voice is of key importance to
the success of a project. Further, the importance of the reallocation of
power over decision-making can be seen here. The developers shall
make the local people feel that they are given the power to be really
involved in the reallocation of benefits and compensation of a project.
The third characteristic, the redistribution of ownership, can also be
reflected here. Particularly, the compensation scheme, which is directly
involved in the redistribution of ownership, can be critical to the suc-
cess of a project. The developers must be very carefully in dealing with
this issue.
Thirdly, properly sharing benefits with the local communities is a
way to gain support from them. Again, this is where the third char-
acteristic comes in. Redistribution of ownership to make the local
people feel that they are fairly treated can gain support from the local
people towards developers’ project. The way of sharing, is also im-
portant. While it is normal to compensate local communities in a lum
sump way, it is better to provide continuous support, or engagement,
over the project life time. For example, the project can provide op-
portunities to the local communities for jobs, making them in the same
boat with the investors. Given the prevailing shortage of financial re-
sources, the project investors can even provide loans and other financial
assistance to allow the local communities to build their capacity for the
project, a practice that is widely used in mining community develop-
ment [43].
Lastly, project development strategies should be designed to reflect
the long process. This is also where the third characteristic is reflected.
The redistribution of ownership should not only be considered spatially,
but also temporally. The benefits some projects created for the local
residents in the short run may be limited. For example, although China
has built many hydropower plants in Myanmar, the local people do not
see many benefits because most of the electricity generation was
exported to China and Thailand while the economic benefits were re-
tained by the government [54]. Given this situation, hydropower pro-
jects could be started at a small scale and to first meet local needs,
whereby the dramatic impact of relocating large numbers of people
could take place only after local communities have accepted the overall
benefits of the project.
Much more could also be done on the side of the Chinese govern-
ment, namely, realizing its obligation to promote good practices in
overseas Chinese investment practice. The government should empha-
size its role as a facilitator, not a salesman, and pay more attention to
the environmental and social impacts arising from its overseas invest-
ment. While it is not feasible to directly regulate the behaviors of the
numerous private Chinese investors, the Chinese government, however,
could look into creating institutions imitating those such as the Japan
External Trade Organization (JETRO). Such bodies could coordinate
Chinese overseas investment, create legal frameworks to regulate
overseas investment, and provide services to improve the capacity of
overseas investors. Furthermore, the Chinese government could con-
sider introducing a voluntary performance ranking system by which the
Chinese overseas investors’ performance scores could influence finan-
cing and other supporting policies.
More importantly, the government can facilitate overseas invest-
ment by creating positive image of China and Chinese investment by
utilizing soft power. Soft power can be built through promoting suc-
cessful Chinese stories that also have regional impact. Many Chinese
lessons and experiences can be used to help ASEAN countries in their
development. For instance, China's experience in improving competi-
tiveness is a replicable example. The Chinese industrial competitiveness
has been developed since its accession to the WTO in 2001. While in-
itially many Chinese industries were worried about loss of competition
with international peers, the reality is that China has eventually become
a global factory. China's experiences in entering the WTO demonstrate
that structural reform and other policy interventions are effective in
improving national competitiveness and these reforming experiences
are applicable to other developing countries [51]. Regarding the energy
sector, China's success in providing nation-wide access to electricity
[52] is a ‘success story’ that is of particular relevance to ASEAN
members such as Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos and Myanmar. Providing
electricity access to 1.3 billion people in such a diversified landscape is
a great achievement in human development by any standard. China's
rapid progress in renewable energy development should also be able to
offer useful lessons and experiences for the ASEAN countries.
The image building could be further supported by China aid pro-
grams, which, however should be restructured to be closer to the people
than before. The current aid programs could be restructured to divert
funds from ‘image projects’ to grassroots projects. Just as a Chinese
scholar said, the Chinese government has learned its lesson from fo-
cusing too much on the elites, and now the government knows that
“deals and agreements are not solid if they are not based on people-to-
people relations” [53].
6. Conclusion and policy implications
This paper argues that ‘sense of ownership’ is the key to the success
of investment projects in the energy sector and the BRI creates a new
need and chance to promote building up ‘sense of ownership’. This
study uses the ‘sense of ownership’ framework to analyze the success
and failure of energy sector investment in ASEAN and to provide a
theoretical foundation for the people-to-people bond under the BRI.
Building ‘sense of ownership’ is widely applied in natural resource
management, in which energy is a key component. Energy projects,
particularly hydropower projects, often has deep impact on economic
and environment and thus frequently tend to arouse controversy. Only
with engagement in, and support from the community, can it be con-
sidered as sustainable, as in the case of the Theun 2 Hydroelectric
Project in Laos [50]. The building of ‘sense of ownership’ is particularly
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important in the energy sector in ASEAN because Chinese investment
often incurs significant criticisms. ASEAN, where many controversial
hydro power projects are undertaken by Chinese firms, further put them
in spotlight.
The analysis shows that among the five priorities listed in the Action
Plan, people-to-people bond should be the forerunner and foundation
for other policy priorities to achieve ‘sense of ownership’. Our study
demonstrates that the successful building of the ‘sense of ownership’
needs to be achieved in the process, in the outcome and with a large
scope of, present and future, stakeholders. Our study also shows that
local communities' ‘sense of ownership’ can mitigate many of those
criticisms and thus minimize challenges and difficulties in investment
activities.
Based on the study of Chinese overseas investment in ASEAN's en-
ergy sector, two policy implication could be drawn. First, ‘people-to-
people bond’ should be placed as a priority in implementation of BRI.
Even though it will not create immediate and tangible outcomes, it can
create a friendly and enabling environment that minimizes challenges
and difficulties for the BRI (investment) projects. Given the growing
scepticism in ASEAN, increasing investment activities further boosted
by BRI are not sustainable in ASEAN. Therefore, increasing social ac-
ceptance of Chinese investment in ASEAN is a must and building ‘sense
of ownership’ is a key instrument to achieve better social acceptance.
Therefore, implementation of ‘people-to-people bond’ is not only a
component of BRI, but also a safeguard mechanism for BRI.
Second, the host communities and even the host country's voice
should be considered in the advancement of Chinese investment.
Building ‘sense of ownership’ requires ownership in the process (whose
voice is heard), ownership in the outcome (whose voice is codified),
and the ownership distribution (who is affected by the action) [21]; p.
283). Chinese investors should pay more attention to its ways in dealing
with local communities in order to build ‘sense of ownership’. Tradi-
tionally, the Chinese investors are often good at making relationship
with government but poor in communicating with the local people, or
the grassroots. Chinese investors are reluctant to dialogue with those
having opposite interests and the investors lack experiences in orga-
nizing groups to support their projects. The Chinese investors need to
understand and respect the different views and norms of people in other
countries.
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